Essay on What Obstacles Did the Yugoslav Delegation Face at the Paris Peace Conference (1919–20) and How Successful Was the Delegation in Achieving Its Aims?
Number of words: 7667
Introduction
In this essay I will explore the obstacles the Yugoslav delegation faced at the Paris Peace Conference and then evaluate how successful the delegation were in achieving their aims. The essay is divided into three sections: the first two subdivisions will be concerned with the internal and external obstacles the delegation faced. Like Auty, I believe internal and external obstacles are logical subdivisions, which can be used to indentify the various problems encountered.[1] Internal obstacles will be concerned with difficulties which were endogenous to the delegation and the newly formed state, whilst external obstacles is in regards to obstacles which were exogenous to the jurisdiction of the delegation or the state. The third section will be concerned with assessing how successful I believe the delegation was in achieving its aims.
A lively debate pervades the historiography concerning the obstacles the delegation faced at the Peace Conference. Mitrovic, a leading historian on the Paris Peace Conference, argues that the external complication of secret treaties made during the war were a particular obstacle for the delegation.[2] Although Mitrovic recognizes that the lack of recognition received by the new ‘Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes’ (KSCS) at the beginning of the Conference was an obstacle, it is treated as less significant than other factors.[3] I agree with this perspective as the delegation was tolerated, even if the official name was not originally accepted. Evans conversely argues that internal issues, namely the call for autonomy from Croatia and Montenegro caused significant problems to the delegation.[4]
However, generally there is a harmony of opinion regarding the obstacles that existed. Research indicates that there is more contention in relation to the delegation’s success. For example Macmillan argues that the delegates failed to achieve their aims after considering the long-term impact of the delegation’s ‘achievements’.[5] However I agree with Lederer, who is less pessimistic and argues that the aims were accomplished; I do not feel that this is contradicted by the problems that arose later in the region.[6] Temperley believes the delegation’s aims were realized and is particularly complimentary of their achievements.[7] Temperley’s books were published in 1921 shortly after the convention concluded, so his views are arguably less biased due to the long-term view that often overshadows the KSCS delegation’s achievements.
Context
The two main aims of the delegation were to gain recognition and achieve their territorial ambitions.[8] The KSCS was officially declared on the 1 December 1918.[9] It comprised numerous states from various former empires and authorities.[10] However since the KSCS was formed without allied sanction, it was not recognised and did not have legitimate frontiers; only the Conference could solve these issues.[11] Mandelbaum observes that the Paris Peace Conference was a change from the former tradition of territory and recognition being based solely on military might, frontiers were to be drawn up to secure the wellbeing of the populace that dwelled within it.[12] I concur with this view, as although there had been previous Peace Conferences such as the first and second Hague Conferences, they were not on the same scale as the Paris Peace Conference. The addition of Wilson’s 14 points also provided uniqueness to the aims of the Conference.[13] The delegation was invited to the Conference on 16th January 1919, but was referred to as the ‘Kingdom of Serbia’. The question of the international recognition of the state was a matter to be left to the Conference participants.[14] The main tasks for the KSCS delegates was gaining favourable frontiers for the new state as well as gaining international recognition.[15]
Internal Obstacles
Internal obstacles came from three main areas: the unrest within Croatia, Montenegro and Albania, a lack of preparation from the delegation and disunity among the delegates (particularly between Pasic and Trumbic). Members of the ‘big four’ vocalised concerns about their worry regarding internal issues within the newly established state.[16] It appeared to the Allies that the state they were representing was not united and therefore did not deserve the recognition or the frontiers they were claiming. There were calls for autonomy from various territories within the KSCS, particularly from Croatia and Montenegro. Macmillan notes, the allies would not legitimise a state in the name of self-determination within an area which was not united.[17] Djilas argues that the majority of Croats did not identity with the new state; this manifested itself in electoral success for the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, who in November 1920 gained 230,590 votes and 50 seats in the Constituent Assembly elections.[18] The party itself was lead by Radic, who called for a separate identity and independence for Croatia.[19] This party has been described by leading scholars as a “national movement”.[20] Radic also organised a petition containing 115,167 signatures which was sent to the Conference in early February asking for support for a neutral Croat Peasant Republic.[21] It must also be noted that it was not just Radic’s party which was against the KSCS state, the Communist party (CPY) also took up the cause, and they wished to change the state through revolutionary means.[22] Communists also did well at the November 1920 elections; however as only 65% of those eligible to do so voted, and some would have been voting as they genuinely agreed with the Communist ideology, one cannot assume every Croat was against the new KSCS state.[23] Benson argues that the Communist threat was less than the threat from Radic and his party. However I believe this represented an obstacle for the KSCS delegates,[24] because the influence of these political forces worried allied delegates.[25] The fractured nature of the area is also shown through the views of the Montenegrin people. The question of unification was never posed to the Montenegrin populace,[26] many were not happy about joining the KSCS. The Montenegrins had their own unique history and identity, despite being Serbs who had fled invading Turks in the Fourteenth Century.[27] They believed they had a history of leading the Serb people as well as belonging.[28] This internal issue was an extreme obstacle to the KSCS delegation as it made achieving there aims more difficult.
Internal problems were also expressed through non-political means. For example in Croatia in September 1920 revolts erupted in South and East Zagreb, which had to be violently subdued by the Serbian army.[29] However the violent internal issues within the KSCS are best exemplified through viewing occurrences in Montenegro. Djokic states that, problems with Montenegro were both internal and external affairs.[30] It would be wrong to assume Montenegro did not express its anger politically;[31] however the main manifestation was displayed through armed clashes between the Federalists and the Unionists.[32] The Serbian army had to be used to suppress the Federalist forces on numerous occasions.[33]
Within Albania the situation has been described by historians as “volatile and inflammatory”[34], with armed revolts against the Yugoslav authorities and guerrilla warfare tactics utilised by Albanians in both Serbia and Montenegro.[35] There was also aggression from the Serbs towards Albanians, particularly within Kosovo, which according to one petition sent to the Peace Conference culminated in 12,371 deaths and 22,000 imprisonments.[36] Not only did the violent uprisings indicate to the allied nations that the state was potentially unstable and not every state was willing participant, but it also possibly distracted the attention of the delegates themselves. The delegates heard news of such violence which caused them great anxiety.[37] These worries and distractions were an obstacle to the delegation as they prevented them fully focusing effectively on achieving their aims. It may also have suggested to the Allies that the delegates were not fully representative of the wishes of the people and the state was unstable, which according to both British official position and French secret documents would be very detrimental to the Yugoslav delegates achieving their aims.[38]
Another internal obstacle for the Yugoslav delegation to contend with was that the delegates themselves were not fully prepared. Lederer points out that, in a short time the KSCS had to form a government, establish a national administration, begin economic integration and prepare a case for the Peace Conference (among other things).[39] The delegates simply had no time to prepare a frontier programme or to be fully organised;[40] members of the 110 strong delegation were still arriving 3 weeks after the Conference had convened.[41] The delegates needed to be fully organised and well prepared in order to present a convincing case to the Allies who could aid them in achieving their aims.
Although they were ostensibly Yugoslav patriots, there is evidence of disharmony amongst the delegation; this seems logical when one considers the mixture of occupations amongst them. There was a mix of intellectuals, professionals, experts and soldiers. Some former serving soldiers within the delegation had been fighting against each other during the war.[42] There was also disagreement regarding the priorities of the frontiers.[43] Although historians argue that disunity amongst delegation at the Conference was not a unique phenomenon,[44] the fact the delegation had little time to prepare, caused internal debates which were evident to the Allies and raised questions about the validity of their aims.
The disunity amongst the delegates is best illustrated when viewing the relationship between Pasic and Trumbic, two of the three delegation leaders. Historians state that Pasic was annoyed upon hearing the news he would have to work with Trumbic at the Conference.[45] Pasic and Trumbic were antithetical partners to a common cause,[46] differing on their political aspirations for the new state.[47] They could not even agree on what the new state should be named.[48] The two delegates also had different ideas on frontier design: Pasic was primarily concerned with the Bulgarian, Romanian and Hungarian boarder, whilst Trumbic was concerned with areas along the Adriatic coast which Italy contested, this was known as the ‘Adriatic question’.[49] Both were willing to use the frontiers they were less interested in as bartering points to gain the territories they wanted. When one views Trumbic’s past employment as a lawyer in Dalmatia, it seems easy to conceive why he had such a preoccupation with the regions the Italians contested.[50]
Although the two delegates managed to put up a united front concerning their territorial aims,[51] I believe their disunity was an obstacle to the KSCS delegation. The occasions of disagreement such as whether to follow an ethnic line of argument for some frontiers,[52] possibly overshadowed the times the two delegates concurred. Significantly, the squabbles between the delegates affected the way the delegation was perceived.[53] This made the disunity amongst Pasic and Trumbic another obstacle to face during the Conference, as it affected the opinion of the men deciding upon the success of the KSCS delegation’s aims.
External Obstacles
The delegation had to face a number of external obstacles, some of which arose before the Conference had convened. Originally the intention of the Allies was to allow the Serbian kingdom two seats within the Conference; this would have caused further internal issues as not all three nations would have been able to appoint a representative.[54] Eventually they were granted three seats; arguably this was recognition for the Serbian contribution to the war.[55] However this was no great success, as it only gave them the same number as Brazil, whose contribution included “two of three torpedo boats”.[56] I agree with Lampe, who argues that only having three seats weakened their strength within negotiations.[57] This is particularly true when you consider that the ‘big four’ each had five seats.
Italy was a major factor in most external obstacles that the Yugoslav delegation faced because of the power and influence they wielded within the Conference. With five seats, Italy was able to make life difficult for the delegation; ensuring territorial claims by the delegation were not made until Italy had stated their case.[58] The hostile stance taken by Italy is well summarized by viewing the seating plan of the conference which placed Italian delegates opposite the Yugoslav delegates, almost in a parliamentary oppositional style.[59] I argue that Italian influence also ensured that the delegation was unprepared for a number of Conference meetings, because insufficient notice was given (Italy were part of the Council of 10, later the Council of 4, who would decide when meetings were).[60] For example only 4 hours notice was given to the KSCS before they had to present their case on the Adriatic question.[61] Having such a powerful opponent was a very difficult obstacle for the KSCS delegation to overcome.
The Italians also believed that the KSCS were part of the enemy as there delegation, (which was of mixed composition), contained some defeated nations; therefore they argued that they should not be allowed at the Conference.[62] They were particularly irritated that Zolger, who had once been Minister without portfolio in the Austrian government, was now ranking fourth in the KSCS delegation.[63] Despite attempts from Secretary of State Robert Lansing to argue the case that no member of the KSCS should be viewed as an enemy,[64] the Italians in particular would not change their opinion. This was a great obstacle for the delegation as it made them less likely to achieve their aims if some members of the Conference questioned the legitimacy of their place at the Conference. It also posed a more complex conundrum, as the former Austro Hungarian areas of the KSCS state would now owe reparation payments to Serbia.[65] Under the treaty of St Germain and St Trianon reparations were ordered from the former Austro Hungarian States, causing an economic setback for the new KSCS state,[66] it also brought a negative focus from the Allies to the delegation, rather than them centering their attention on what the KSCS delegation was trying to achieve.
As Djokic describes, the delegation was tolerated but ignored at the beginning of the Conference.[67] Despite the delegation’s less than subtle hints (e.g. using paper headed “The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” for its correspondence),[68] the Allies would not recognise the state, and the Italians in particular were against it.[69] At first the KSCS state was referred to as the “Kingdom of Serbia”.[70] I argue that this lack of recognition affected more than just pride, it also impacted on their economy. The Allies did not agree trade with the new state until March 1919; even the former enemy Bulgaria agreed trade with the Allies before the KSCS.[71] Figures indicate that foreign trade, both import and export was lower in 1919 than in the next 10 years, I argue that lack of recognition for the KSCS was a contributory factor.[72] This shows the lack their low seat allocation and lack of international recognition was major obstacles for the delegation to contend with. Also, despite Montenegro uniting with the KSCS prior to the Conference,[73] the Allies still recognised them as an independent state and offered them a separate seat (that was never used), again meaning they were given less seats than they needed and arguably deserved.[74] The Italians, again, were the catalysts in the call for an independent Montenegro.[75]
Even once the KSCS was internationally acknowledged there were still obstacles to overcome concerning recognition. The National Minorities Act 1919 was created to uphold rights of minorities in the New State; however the Allies refused to extend the minority label to areas which had been captured in the Balkan Wars, with particular reference to Macedonia.[76] Despite the historical significance the areas held for the KSCS, the allies still did not acknowledge that they had become assimilated into the new state.[77] Pasic argued that areas attained during the Balkan Wars were not under the jurisdiction of the Conference.[78] This argument failed and a clause was inserted into the Act that Serbia was discharged of her old territorial obligations but upon reunification all former states would be included within the Minorities Act.[79] Whether Macedonians are minorities or not is a complex issue and appears in a different part to the concerns over the Croats and Montenegrins. This becomes particularly convoluted when you consider that studies showed the Macedonian populace were unsure of what state they belonged to prior to the Conference.[80] The Minorities Act did not particularly affect the KSCS as the League of Nations did not enforce the terms of the act, despite it being their duty. [81] However it did show that the Allies disagreed with the KSCS about what ethnicity and state the Macedonian people belonged to. More importantly it caused a protest by the KSCS delegates which culminated in a refusal to sign the Treaty of St. Germain.[82] This caused further disadvantages to the delegation, such as the defiance of Wilson’s principles, upon which they had originally based their territorial claims.[83]
Another obstacle for the delegation was that out of seven countries with which they were negotiating frontiers, only Greece agreed with their proposals.[84] Even the US delegation, which was the most powerful ally the KSCS had, was unimpressed with their territorial claims.[85] Italy was vocal in their complaints, arguing that the London Treaty 1915 should be honored, which would seriously impact on KSCS claims in he Adriatic region.[86] However the London Treaty was in violation of Wilson’s 14 points and the American delegation refused to honor any secret treaties made during the War.[87] The grievance felt by some Italians led to a series of occupations within areas they believed they had the right to, for example the occupation of Fiume by D’Annunzio in August 1919.[88] The fact the KSCS frontier requests were unsupported by nearly all Conference members was a difficult obstacle and this was further complicated by secret treaties which had been made concerning future KSCS territories before the KSCS existed.
The achievements of the KSCS delegation
Eventually the KSCS became internationally recognised. It would therefore appear that in this case the delegation was successful, as this was one of its key aims. Some nations were quick to recognise the new state, such as Greece on 26 January 1919, Norway on 29 January and Switzerland on 26 February.[89] Arguably the recognition from America on 7 February, (other historians argue recognition from America came earlier[90]) was the most significant moment in the KSCS state gaining recognition from the other allies, as the Americans set about trying to convince Italy, France and Britain to follow suit.[91] Eventually recognition for the KSCS state was passed by the Supreme Council on 29 April 1919 when they accepted the credentials of the Yugoslav delegation.[92] Official recognition from Britain came on 2 June 1919, with France following 3 days later.[93].Although there is some debate concerning the date of recognition, the important aspect is that international recognition finally came to the KSCS state, [94] in this sense it would appear that the delegation was successful.
However, the question of how successful the delegation was at making this aim come to fruition still arises. Mitrovic and Lampe are both in agreement that the arrival of the German delegation on 25 April 1919 significantly hastened the process of international recognition for the KSCS.[95] If the KSCS was not recognised then the German delegation could question the legitimacy of Conference members. It could be argued that the aim was achieved, not by the delegates, rather because the Allies feared that they could not properly serve justice to Germany without it. It could also be argued, that the KSCS was only handed recognition, (from the French and British in particular), as nations were fed up of supporting the Italians due to their behaviour, particularly their persistent leaving and returning to the Conference.[96] There was also still some resentment from the Allies due to Italy’s poor performance during the war.[97] Italy was the main opponent of the KSCS gaining recognition as it infringed upon Italian territorial claims.[98] Marston argues that if the Italians had not delayed proceedings, the KSCS would have gained recognition much sooner.[99]
However there was thought to be deterioration in the behaviour of the Italian delegations. On 21 February 1919 Nicholson’s diary describes the Italian delegation as “sulky children” who “obstruct and delay everything”.[100] There are numerous examples of the petulance and obstructive attitude of the Italian delegation during the Peace Conference; however the best example is the Italians threatening to torpedo the Conference.[101] Macmillan suggests a cause between this threat and KSCS gaining formal recognition from the British and French.[102] This would show the KSCS gained recognition not only because of the delegation’s efforts, but also because Allied members were not willing to support Italian policy due to their behaviour. Although compelling, such reasons were never acknowledged by the Allies as contributing to the KSCS recognition.
I do not doubt the delegation themselves should be given full acknowledgment for their geographical boundary success. Once the KSCS had gained recognition it could be argued that they had already successfully secured areas within their new frontiers which were of greatest value to them. For example Bosnia Herzegovina had already joined the KSCS state of their own accord so there was no contention once recognition was gained.[103] KSCS frontier negotiation took some time to conclude, with 7 separate treaties delegating the new borders.[104] As previously mentioned Resolutions and agreements were quickly concluded with Greece as their cooperation had been a constant, problems were also successfully negotiated with Romania.[105] In respect to the Northern frontiers, the delegation was particularly successful at bargaining favourable borders, gaining the majority of Backa and Banat.[106] Under the Treaty of Neuilly they gained 1500 square km of territory with a population of approximately 100,000,[107] and under the Treaty of Trianon they gained most, arguably all, of the territories they claimed.[108] Some areas they gained were of vast agricultural wealth. The delegation had gained areas which often were heavily contested by other nations,[109] and in this context it would appear the delegation were very successful in achieving its aims.
I disagree with historians who regard it as a failure that the KSCS was unsuccessful in its bid for certain areas. Klagenfurt was lost to Austria in a plebiscite, in which 22,025 voted in favour of a continuation of Austrian rule, and only 15,279 voting to become inaugurated into the KSCS.[110] There was a 96% electoral participation in this vote, proving beyond doubt the majority of the public got what it wanted.[111] A similar Allied-controlled plebiscite occurred in the former Habsburg territory of Carinthia. Carinthia also voted to remain part of Austria despite the South Slav majority.[112] Historians speculate that military service and potential material difficulty was enough of a deterrent to prevent the Slavs in Carinthia from voting to join the KSCS.[113] The KSCS already had internal problems and a ‘melting pot’ of ethnic minorities which were causing problems to the state.[114] They did not need unwilling participants within the new state, as this would have caused complications for its future. Therefore it could be viewed as a success rather than a failure that these areas were not recruited.
The main area of criticism for the KSCS frontier negotiations was the terms of the Treaty of Rapallo.[115] However, this was direct negotiation between KSCS and Italy after the Conference had ended.[116] It is for this reason I do not include the successes or failures of the Treaty within the achievements of the delegation. The only real criticism one could have for the delegation is that they failed to negotiate terms with the Italians before the conference closed. However it must be noted that the Italian delegation were petulant and obstructive, and were primarily concerned with gaining their “pound of flesh” promised in the Treaty of London.[117] This made negotiating almost impossible, particularly when the Italians left, or threatened to leave the conference whenever they were not getting there own way.[118] The French were also unable to fill the mediating void left by Wilson’s departure shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles 28 June.[119] I do not believe that the inability to reach an agreement in frontier negotiations with the Italians during the Conference was a failure for the KSCS delegation; this was an insurmountable task and should not detract from the excellent territorial achievements they made.
Conclusion
The KSCS delegation faced both internal and external obstacles. Internally, there were calls for more independence and autonomy from various states with the KSCS. Within Croatia and Montenegro there was a political shift to parties which were against the present KSCS state. There were also violent uprisings which had to be suppressed within these states as well as in Albania. This illustrated to the Allies that the KSCS was not a secure state and therefore did not deserve to gain their frontier requests or become internationally recognised. The differing views among the delegation (particularly between Trumbic and Pasic) made their aims more difficult to achieve. The indecision and disparity among the delegation made it more difficult to present a reputable case which the Allies would agree with.
There were many different external obstacles. Problems began before the Conference had convened, as they were only assigned 3 seats, which weakened their negotiating strength. The 3 seats that were given were not intended for the KSCS but Serbia, as there was no international recognition for the new state. The Allies also considered Montenegro a separate state, granting them their own seat at the Conference. They also viewed the people of Macedonia as a minority within the KSCS, showing there was a differing in opinion between KSCS and the Allies. Further problems existed due to the mixed composition of the delegation which was comprised of some defeated nations, causing the Italians in particular to question the legitimacy of their place at the Conference. When the delegation did eventually propose their frontier suggestions they were contested by all but Greece. Italy in particular objected as the KSCS frontier proposals infringed on areas promised to them under the terms of the London Treaty. Italy were a powerful opponent as they were part of the team which essentially ran the Conference, therefore they could make life difficult for the delegation and prevent them achieving their aims.
The delegation was successful in achieving their aims. They gained international recognition from all members of the Conference less than 6 months after it had begun. The delegation also succeeded in gaining favourable frontiers. A number of areas which were not gained were lost because the people living there expressed their will through a plebiscite. This could be viewed as an advantage as assimilating areas which did not want to be part of the KSCS state could have caused later problems. It is unfortunate that negotiations with Italy had to be resumed after the Conference; however this should not be viewed as a failure, as the Italians petulance and obstruction concerning any negotiation, made the task impossible within the time-frame of the Paris Peace Conference. To conclude, the delegation achieved its aims against what appeared to be insurmountable internal and external obstacles.
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[1] Phyllis Auty, Yugoslavia (Thames and Hudson, 1965) p.72
[2] Dejan Djokic, Yugoslavism, histories of a failed idea 1918-1922 (C. Hurst &Co. (publishers Ltd, 2003) p.48
[3] Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.54
[4] James Evans, Great Britain and the creation of Yugoslavia, negotiating Balkan nationalist and identity (Tauris Academic Studies, 2008) p.197
[5] Macmillan, Margaret, Paris, six months that changed the world 1919 (Random House, 2002) p.123
[6] Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, a study in frontiermaking (Yale University Press, 1963) p.ix
[7] HMV Temperley, A history of the Peace Conference of Paris, volume IV (Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton 1921) p.212
[8] Dejan Djokic, Nikola Pasic and Ante Trumbic: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Haus Publishing, 2010) p.127
[9] Auty, Yugoslavia, p.71
[10] For full list of nations part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes before the peace conference see, The Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Ministerial Council, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 1919-1929 (Beograd, 1930) p.viii
[11] Lederer, Yugoslavia, p.82
[12] Rajv G C Thomas, Yugoslavia unravelled, sovereignty, self determination, intervention (Lexington Books, 2003) p.42
[13] For more information on Wilsons 14 points, see History Learning Site, ‘Woodrow Wilsons 14 points’, (last accessed 23 February 2011) <http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/woodrow_wilson1.htm>
[14] Lederer, Yugoslavia, p.112
[15] Lederer, Yugoslavia, p.120
[16] The ‘the big four’ contained the UK, America, France and Italy. Evans, Great, p.187
[17] Macmillan, Margaret Paris 1919, part 1: the reordering of Europe (Viewed 20th February 2011) <http://www.futurecasts.com/book%20review%2010-4.htm#YUgoslavia>
[18] Aleksa Dijilas, The contested country, Yugoslav unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953 (Harvard University Press, 1991) p.60
[19] Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia (Ernest Benn Limited, 1971) p.59
[20] Djokic, Nikola, p.155
[21] Sabrina P Ramet, The three Yugoslavias, state building and legitimation 1918-2005 (Indiana University Press, 2006) p.50
[22] Jill A. Irvine, The Croat question partisan politics in the formation of the Yugoslav socialist state (Westview Press Inc, 1993) pp.57-61
[23] Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, p.61
[24] Leslic Benson, Yugoslavia, a concise history (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) pp.27-28
[25] Evans, Great, p.189
[26] Ana S. Trbovich, A legal geography of Yugoslavia’s disintegration (Oxford University Press, 2008) p.117
[27] Margaret Macmillan, Paris, six months that changed the world 1919 (Random House, 2002) p.118
[28] Djokic, Nikola, p.86
[29] John R Lampe, Yugoslavia as history, twice there was a country, second edition (Cambridge University Press, 2000) p.119
[30] Djokic, Nikola, p.81
[31] Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, p.61
[32] Djokic, Nikola, p.85
[33] Lampe, Yugoslavia, p.111
[34] Miranda Vickers, The Albanians a Modern History (I.B Tauris and Co Ltd, 2008) p.94
[35] Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.55; History of Albania, ‘Interwar Albania 1918-41’ (Last accessed 20th May 2011) <http://motherearthtravel.com/albania/history-8.htm>
[36] Vickers, The Albanians, p.96
[37] Djokic, Nikola, p.78
[38] Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.55
[39] Lederer, Yugoslavia, p.81
[40] Lederer, Yugoslavia, p.83
[41] Djokic, Nikola, p.60
[42] For more information on the composition of the Yugoslav delegation, see Macmillan, Paris, p.109
[43] Macmillan, Paris, p.109
[44] Djokic, Nikola, p.79
[45] Macmillan, Paris, p.113
[46] Djokic, Nikola, p.71
[47] Dejan Djokic, ‘The Paris Peace Conference 1919-1920: a Yugoslav perspective, the Balkan Chronicle’ (Last accessed 20th March 2011) <http://www.balkanchronicle.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=475:the-paris-peace-conference-of-1919-1920-a-yugoslav-perspective&catid=51:other-interest&Itemid=487>
[48] Djokic, Nikola, p.xx
[49] Djokic, Nikola, p.77
[50] Eric J Patterson, Yugoslavia (Arrowsmith, 1936) p.64
[51] Djokic, Nikola, p.88 For example on the 31st of January 1919 during their presentation on the case on Banat
[52] Djokic, Nikola, p.89
[53] Evans, Great, p.187
[54] Djokic, Nikola, p.xix
[55] Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.45
[56] F.S. Marston, the Peace Conference of 1919, organization and procedure (Greenwood Press Publishers, 1981) p.61
[57] Lampe, Yugoslavia, p.113
[58] Djokic, Nikola, p.74
[59] Djokic, Nikola, p.58
[60] Djokic, Nikola, p.84
[61] Djokic, Nikola, p.115
[62] Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, p.54, Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.46
[63] Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.46
[64] Marston, The Peace, p.201
[65] Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.45
[66] For information concerning the reparations of former Austro-Hungarian nations in the KSCS, see The Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Ministerial Council, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 1919-1929 (Beograd, 1930) p.lviii
[67] Djokic, Nikola, p.63
[68] Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.45
[69] Djokic, Nikola, p.xxii
[70] Dejan Djokic, Elusive compromise, a history of interwar Yugoslavia (Hurst and Company, 2007) p.42
[71] Temperley, A history, p.206
[72] The Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Ministerial Council, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 1919-1929 (Beograd, 1930) p.xliii
[73] Trbovich, A legal, p.116
[74] Djokic, Nikola ,p.65
[75] Lederer, Yugoslavia, p.114
[76] Benson, Yugoslavia, p.34
[77] Benson, Yugoslavia, p.34
[78] Temperley, A history v, p.146
[79] Temperley, A history v, p.146
[80] Patterson, Yugoslavia, p.70
[81] Thomas, Yugoslavia, p.50
[82] Lederer, Yugoslavia, p.246
[83] Lederer, Yugoslavia, p.246
[84] Djokic, Nikola, p.62, for details concerning what boarders the KSCS delegation proposed, see Lederer, Yugoslavia, pp.96-107
[85] Nicolson, Peacemaking, p.226
[86] W.W Gottlieb, Studies in secret diplomacy during the First World War (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1957) p.326, for terms of the London Treaty see Nicolson, Peacemaking, p.100
[87] Nicolson, Peacemaking, p.178
[88] Benson, Yugoslavia, p.26
[89] Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.54
[90] Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, p.53
[91] Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.55
[92] Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.113
[93] Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.56
[94] Djokic, Nikola, p.124, Patterson, Yugoslavia, p.68
[95] Djokic, Yugoslavism, p.55, Lampe, Yugoslavia, p.111
[96] History.com, ‘Italian delegates return to Paris Peace Conference’, (Last Accessed 22nd February 2011) <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/italian-delegates-return-to-paris-peace-conference>
[97] For example the British and French believed Italy had botched their attacks on Austria-Hungary, for more examples, see History.com, ‘Italian delegates return to Paris Peace Conference’
[98] Lampe, Yugoslavia, p.113
[99] F.S. Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, organization and procedure (Greenwood Press Publishers, 1981) p.201
[100] Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (Constable and Company Ltd, 1944) p.266
[101] Margaret, Macmillan ‘Paris 1919, part 1: the reordering of Europe’ (Last Accessed 20th February 2011) <http://www.futurecasts.com/book%20review%2010-4.htm#YUgoslavia>
[102] Macmillan ‘Paris 1919, part 1: the reordering of Europe’
[103] Macmillan, Paris, p.121
[104] Benson, Yugoslavia, p.26
[105] Benson, Yugoslavia, p.26
[106] Temperley, A history, p.212
[107] Djokic, Nikola, p136.
[108] Djokic, Nikola, p.137
[109] For examples of territories gained despite contention from other nations, see Temperley, a history, p.212
[110] Djokic, Nikola, p.134
[111] Djokic, Nikola, p.134
[112] Trbovich, A legal, p.117
[113] Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, p.54
[114] Lederer, Yugoslavia, p.309
[115] For terms of the Rapallo Treaty see Temperley, HMV, a history of the Peace Conference of Paris, volume V (Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton 1921) p.431
[116] Temperley, A history, p.210
[117] Patterson, Yugoslavia, p.75
[118] Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp.274-314
[119] Lederer, Yugoslavia, p.219