I have a 2:1 in Philosophy & Politics from the University of Essex, a highly acclaimed institution for the study of these disciplines. During my study I became proficient at analysing texts and applying rational argument. I covered such areas as deconstructing the modern state, its apparatus and infrastructure and possibilities for economic growth; the history of political theory from Machiavelli’s The Prince up to Marx and Engels’ writings; as well as more specific, in-depth courses on canonised philosophical texts from the Continental tradition such as Sartre’s Being and Nothingness and Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil, as well as touching upon some of Martin Heidegger's work. I specialised in Twentieth Century political philosophy of the Continental tradition, and in doing so learned the tenets of critical theory in Adorno & Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. I have also touched upon the relationship between government, morality and society and learned the central arguments of Ecological philosophy. The ability to analyse written material and produce script that highlights the major points of philosophical works is something that comes naturally to me, but of course higher education has enabled me to sharpen these capabilities to a standard that befits examination and scrutiny.
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Confrontation with other cultures forces us to conclude that there is no universal conception of morality. Discuss.
Implicit in the question of whether or not there is a universal morality for all mankind is the debate over moral absolutism (the belief that there are moral prerequisites which govern all of mankind’s actions) and moral relativism (the contrary belief that morality is culturally dependent and stems from norms which emerge from the culture they are bound to). Throughout this paper I shall evaluate the claims of both these schools of thought, relating them to the types of morality espoused by some of the different cultures of the world. The paper will focus on whether moral absolutism necessarily requires an ethnocentric viewpoint in order for it to stand, and whether the prescriptive moral values of the absolutist are necessarily culturally bound to the society in which they are inculcated. The importance of ethnocentrism to the debate is key since it is the claim of the relativist that diversity in cultural heritage creates a similar diversity in moral discourse, and as such makes it impossible for universal moral principles to be prescribed by anyone if they are to apply to radically diverse peoples. This fact makes the moral question an implicitly social and political one also, and I shall illuminate some of the points of conflict such a debate evokes. I shall use these points of conflict to draw a conclusion on whether it is possible in the climate of global cultural diversity to conceive of a universal morality applicable to all.
Brief elucidations of the absolutist and relativist stances are thus necessary. John W. Cook writes: “the absolutist is one who holds that there are moral principles (or rules or standards) that apply to all people everywhere…he holds that people can recognise or discover these true universal principles and be guided by them both in deciding what their own conduct should be and in judging the conduct of others” (Cook, 1999, p.7). The moral absolutist is a thinker who believes in the existence of moral guidelines which are independent of enculturation. There are, following his/her reasoning, principles which can be proven to be true regardless of which culture one is talking about. This is not to say that moral standards are accepted and practiced by all cultures, but that there is a binding truth to all conceptions of morality, that there are crucial points of convergence between each which prove that morality exists outside of cultural ties.
Probably the most famous and certainly the most influential of all modern moral absolutists, Immanuel Kant, formulates this morality as such: “Act in such a way that you can wish your maxim to become a universal law (irrespective of what the end in view may be)” (Kant in Reiss (ed.), 2004, p. 122). According to Kant, action is only to be considered just if it follows that anyone performing that same action would still be obeying moral principles. Thus a moral maxim is not concerned with personal gratification, it cannot be used to fulfil an end which is relative to personal desire; it is true by definition because of its universalisability – its applicability to all people everywhere.
This is the point of contention amongst those who characterise morality as relative to culture: “the relativist insists that it is a mistake for anyone to think that he knows what is right and wrong for everyone everywhere, including people of cultures very different from his own. This alleged mistake has been given the name ‘ethnocentrism’” (Cook, 1999, p. 8). The moral relativist accuses the absolutist of a biased viewpoint regarding moral prescription, as the principles espoused by the absolutist are only principles which emerge from the prevailing morality of his/her social situation. The relativist strengthens this point by adding sociological facts: “Empirical research has shown that there are different moralities among the world’s cultures…we acquire our morality, not in any rational way, but by a causal process of “enculturative conditioning”” (Cook, 1999, p.8). Pushing the criticism further, the relativist claims that the absolutist privileges the alleged a priori rationality of his/her position, thus characterising the position as strictly post-Enlightenment, European and prejudiced. This leads Charles Taylor to a more grounded accusation of ethnocentrism: “The supposedly neutral terms in which other people’s actions are identified…all reflect the stress on instrumental reason in [Western] civilisation since the seventeenth century. To see them everywhere is really to distort the action, beliefs, and so on of alien societies in an ethnocentric way” (Taylor, 1985, p. 126).
This is a viewpoint which Richard Rorty eloquently clarifies, using the example of alternative geometries and turning Kant’s axiomatic reasoning on its head: “Alternative geometries are irreconcilable because they have axiomatic structures, and contradictory axioms. They are designed to be irreconcilable. Cultures are not so designed, and do not have axiomatic structures. To say that they have “institutionalised norms” is only to say…that knowledge is never separable from power – that one is likely to suffer if one does not hold certain beliefs at certain times and places. But such institutional backups for beliefs take the form of bureaucrats and policemen, not of “rules of language” and “criteria of rationality”” (Rorty, 1991, p. 26). These statements by Rorty bring an interesting socio-political edge to the debate, as he conflates morality with institutionalised power, as a set of legislative principles which serve the interests of those in power by threatening punishment if those principles are not upheld. As such he firmly dissociates received moral principles from objective rational maxims and characterises them squarely as the result of a given social order.
A characterisation like this – that morality is only the product of a relationship with power – can be seen to have thoroughly immoral consequences when they are applied to different cultures. Edward Said, in his study on Western colonial presence in the East (the Orient as he calls it) says that under these circumstances: “Objective structure…and subjective restructure…become interchangeable. The Orient is overlaid with the Orientalist’s rationality; its principles become his” (Said, 2003, p. 129). Other cultures are only important to the ethnocentric imperial presence if they can be seen to fit in with the presiding culture’s overarching principles. Rorty reinforces this opinion: “beliefs suggested by another culture must be tested by trying to weave them together with beliefs we already have” (Rorty, 1991, p. 26). This is an instance of the ethnocentric tendency for the moral absolutist to reduce the richness of an entirely alien culture to the judgements that can be made of it with recourse to the tenets of Western civilisation’s morality. Such practices have been unequivocally condemned by Said: “every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric…human societies, at least the more advanced cultures, have rarely offered the individual anything but imperialism, racism, and ethnocentrism for dealing with “other” cultures” (Said, 2003, p. 204). If this outlook is the inevitable consequence of an axiomatic form of morality, it seems abundantly clear that the ethnocentric accusation thoroughly debunks the perceived goodness of the moral territory which absolutism occupies.
Since Said has constructed a less-than-desirable notion of Western values, it seems logical now to turn to the “Oriental” values which he sees as being impeded in their development and distribution, to see if they differ radically, and to offer some examples of non-Western approaches to morality in order to gain a fuller account of these “other cultures” which are so indispensible to relativist theory.
First I shall look at Confucianism, as this is an imperialist doctrine which serves as a suitable reference point in relation to Western imperial values. On face value, there appears to be little difference between the two in the opinion of outside influence: “There are some interpretations of Confucianism as authoritarian state orthodoxy or stultifying traditionalism…[or]…as an obsolete cultural curiosity or pre-modern hangover…Straying from the Confucian way not only abandons Chinese culture, it constitutes a failure to be human. [Prominent Confucian thinker] Han Yu often spoke of cultural others in the same breath as beasts” (Tan in Stepanyants (ed.), 2006, p. 123-124). This chastising analysis shows are far more explicit animosity in Confucianism towards deviant morality than we found in the Western model.
However, there is more to the Confucian position than initial impressions portray: “While recognising a gradation in love toward different ‘others’, humanistic Confucianism encourages a widening of the circle and an ever-increasing inclusiveness of others whom the virtue could reach…Humanistic Confucianism requires us to extend the ‘analogy’ beyond ‘our kind’ defined culturally to embrace the entire human species, even the entire cosmos” (Tan in Stepanyants (ed.), 2006, p. 126). We can see now that Confucian values seem to endorse the distribution of virtue via means of inclusivity.
Unfortunately, this inclusivity still remains within the confines of Confucian ethical teaching, and privileges itself above others, but theoretically the doctrine does not prescribe these moral values as axiomatic truths, but as desirable traits to be recognised in the ‘Exemplary Person’, and herein we see a key difference between Confucian values and Western values: “From a Confucian perspective, the ethical requirements of overcoming resistance through virtuous example rather than violence, of transforming transgressors with ritual propriety rather than coercion, means that Confucian ethnocentrism should take the form of persuasion” (Tan in Stepanyants (ed.), 2006, p. 124-125). While both appear to be ethnocentric in focus, the Western doctrinal example seems to arrogantly imply that the truth and validity of its position is self-evident whereas the Confucian model is such that it attempts to convince its detractors by acting cordially and virtuously as a matter of course towards them. The crucial aspect of this inclusivity ethos is the emphasis placed on cross-cultural communication as a means to diplomatically resolving conflict with contrasting cultures, and as such to promote ethical flexibility – something wildly different to axiomatic structuration: “Without cross-cultural learning, Confucianism would not have developed as much as it has. Confucians have been able to transform Confucianism by learning from other cultures…because of the potential in Confucian ethics in facilitating cross-cultural communication…This disposition to put oneself in the other’s place…signifies a willingness to question one’s own horizon, to put at risk what has hitherto been taken for granted” (Tan in Stepanyants (ed.), 2006, p. 125-126).
The example of Confucianism, considered in the light of its inclusivity and flexibility, shows the possibility for a potentially ethnocentric absolute morality to exercise qualities considered desirable for relativists. However, it does nothing to dilute the hypothesis that Western values are inherently self-aggrandizing in their claim to possess objective rational truths about morality.
To reconcile this division of East and West, I now turn to the Hindu tradition. It has been stated that: “The Vedic thinkers believe that the moral laws are the cosmic laws which hold the universe under one moral fabric” (Pradhan in Stepanyants (ed.), 2006, p. 181). This explicates that Hindu teachings propound a thesis that sees morality beyond the confines of human-to-human interaction and instead introduce it as a spiritual necessity. In Hinduism, “morality is a necessary condition of the cosmic order rather than of the human and social order” (Pradhan in Stepanyants (ed.), p. 182). This thesis sees moral law superceding the relativist ethical viewpoint of different moralities for different cultures. Vedic ethics sees morality as having an autonomous existence, which, far from driving a wedge between cultures, binds all people and cultures together.
To draw the comparison between Vedic and Western-rational ethics explicitly, Pradhan compares Hindu values to those proposed by Kant: “Kant’s universalistic ethics propounds a set of values such as obedience to moral law, duty without self-interest and the adoration of the holy. These values, according to him, know no cultural bounds and are available for all rational human beings…The Indian system of Vedanta as propounded in the Upanishads calls for the transcendence of the life in the world for a higher life of the spirit…Like Kant, the Vedanta declares that all rational human beings must distinguish between the higher form of life and the life of sensuous pleasures” (Pradhan in Stepanyants (ed.), 2006, p. 180-181). It can thus be seen that Hinduism and Kantianism share common ground in the belief that moral principles are a matter of personal and spiritual development, which apply to each and every person on an individual basis, because they are either realised and practiced by the agent or they are ignored.
Now that some light has been shed on the capability for moral systems from disparate global traditions to complement each other – as is the case with the Hindus and Kantians – and that an absolute morality need not be ethnocentric – as is the case with Confucianism – the question Rorty et al pose to the moral absolutist can be answered. It seems apparent that in any given culture, Western-rational or otherwise, theorists will attempt to prescribe moral behaviour based on some recognition of eternally binding moral scripture. The basis for such scripture need not be reason alone, as is the case with Western post-Enlightenment values, but can stem from cultural teachings of Royal descent (Confucianism) or from religion and spirituality (Hinduism). This is not necessarily an intrinsic relationship with power as Rorty suggests, as no restrictions on political self-determination are being constructed. It is more likely the case that absolute morality, paradoxically in its different guises, is traditionally practiced in most societies. Relativism does not have the prescriptive strength of absolutism, and so it is difficult to conceive of a system which actively promotes the relativist ideal. In fact, in light of the examples I have given above, it seems that relativism has no normative capacity at all, and is effectively a piece of criticism towards absolute morality rather than a viable alternative to it.
The last remaining question to answer concerns whether, given that we can see similarities in different moral and cultural traditions, and that different cultures will likely try to formulate some form it is possible to conceive of unifying clauses which can accommodate each version of absolutist logic. If we are to conclude that each society will make attempts to define moral law on its own terms, it becomes a political necessity to be able to reconcile these terms with geographically alien versions. As Fred Dallemeyr puts it, we are currently embroiled in a global political situation which sees war and atrocities provoked by highly ideological and ethico-religious sentiments: “Faced with ethnic conflicts and looming “clashes of civilisations”, humankind is called upon to develop a global ethics and civic culture sturdy enough to stem the tide of violence and destruction…it is insufficiently moral…to celebrate universal moral values everywhere without also seeking to enable and empower people in their different settings and locations. Although moral norms and theories may be universal in reach, moral praxis has a different texture, especially when viewed from the angle of global justice” (Dallemeyr in Stepanyants (ed.), p. 102). What Dallemeyr is suggesting is that the existence of absolute moral laws is not enough to avoid immoral clashes of cultures from happening. These moral laws must be entrenched in politico-judicial language which does not alienate any member, thus enabling and empowering local peculiarities, and can serve as a global treaty in order to avoid the immoral practices of violence and destruction. Furthermore, “when certain people and groups present their private positions, goals, and interests as absolute ideals, the various parties speak in the name of history, different confessions of faith speak in the name of God, some states and nations assume the right to sit in judgement over others” (Guseinov in Stepanyants (ed.) 2006, p. 40) it is wrong to confuse personal private politics with moral ideals, as this distorts the nature of cultural pluralism in expecting the state to accommodate private values as if they were universal values. As such, in an era of unparalleled cultural diversity and political pluralism, it is essential that the normative benefits of an absolute morality are realised, to institutionalise a global culture of civility amongst all traditions, in turn avoiding a pendulum-like war of attrition between parties convinced that their local, politicised morality is all that matters.
Bibliography
Cook, John W. – Morality and Cultural Differences (Oxford University Press, 1999)
Kant, Immanuel – “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” in H.S. Reiss (ed.) Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge University Press, 2004)
Taylor, Charles – Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1985)
Rorty, Richard – Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Cambridge University Press, 1991)
Said, Edward W. – Orientalism (Penguin, 2003)
Sor-Hoon Tan – “Cultural Crossings Against Ethnocentric Currents” in Marietta Tigranovna Stepanyants (ed.) Comparative Ethics in a Global Age (CRVP, 2006)
Pradhan, R.C – “Moral values in the Multi-Cultural Context: An Indian Perspective” in Marietta Tigranovna Stepanyants (ed.) Comparative Ethics in a Global Age (CRVP, 2006)
Dallemeyr, Fred – “Global Ethics: Beyond Universalism and Particularism” in Marietta Tigranovna Stepanyants (ed.) Comparative Ethics in a Global Age (CRVP, 2006)
Guseinov, Abdussalam A. – “Is Absolute Morality Possible in Modern Pluralistic Society?” in Marietta Tigranovna Stepanyants (ed.) Comparative Ethics in a Global Age (CRVP, 2006)
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